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Working Paper 




Defying the Oracle? 





Embroiled in economic and political turmoil, Greece took over the presidency of the EU 
Council for the fifth time on 1 January 2014. Given the persistent, ongoing impact of the crisis, 
the Greek presidency is more complicated to administer than the previous one of 2003.  
This paper analyses the political conditions under which the Greek government is running its 
rotating presidency of the Council. It then assesses the presidency’s governing capacity as far as 
institutional, financial and political resources are concerned. Finally, it attempts to outline the 
rationale of the Greek presidency’s agenda and its implementation prospects. This threefold 
analysis sets out the limitations of a soft power exercise that has little real authority in a 
radically shrinking political space, at both national and European level. The Greek government 
would like to promote the idea that the country is an equal partner in the EU system of 
governance, despite Greece's intractable economic, political, and social implosion. This 
presidency is characterised by poor leadership and a lack of vision. It is being called upon to 
coordinate a presidential agenda without being substantially involved in its drafting; it simply 
mediates between European institutions. This trend has a negative impact on the behaviour and 
trust of public administrators, whose personal investment is vital for the smooth functioning of 
the presidency. The paper concludes that Greece’s presidency of the Council of the EU cannot 
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Defying the Oracle? 
The 2014 Greek Presidency of the EU Council 
EPIN Working Paper No. 36 / February 2014 
Filippa Chatzistavrou* 
1. Introduction 
Greece, a country embroiled in economic and political turmoil, took over the presidency of the 
EU Council for the fifth time on 1 January 2014. When the Lisbon Treaty strengthened the 
formal position of the European Council, created the post of High Representative of the Union 
for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and formalised the Trio presidency it further limited the 
rotating presidency to its assigned managerial and day-to-day legislative tasks. The presidency 
of the European Council is now responsible for providing strategic and policy guidance to the 
EU, leaving little room for important political and diplomatic manoeuvres. The Greek EU 
presidency is also expected to be very low profile because of time constraints.  
This year is a decisive one for the EU since major political changes are on the way; namely EP 
elections in May; the appointment of the new European Commission and its new president, and 
a few months later the appointment of the next president of the European Council. The 
presidency is effectively shorter than the usual six months, and thus even weaker, because the 
legislative work stops in April 2014.   
Nevertheless, this mandate could potentially transform the narrative structure of Europe. Greece 
could use this rare opportunity to hold a ‘political’ presidency to review its budgetary and 
economic commitments towards the EU and put the structural heterogeneity between EU 
member states at the heart of the debate on the future of Europe.  
Things seem to be moving in the opposite direction, however. Given the persistent, ongoing 
impact of the crisis, this Greek presidency is more complicated to administer than that of 2003. 
Despite the importance of the issue on the table, this presidency is characterised by poor 
leadership and a lack of vision. 
This paper will first analyse the political conditions under which the Greek government runs its 
rotating presidency of the Council. Second, it will assess the presidency’s existing governing 
capacity as far as institutional, financial and political resources are concerned. Finally, it will 
attempt to outline the rationale of the Greek presidency’s agenda and its implementation 
prospects. 
This threefold analysis will set out the limitations of a soft power exercise that is without real 
authority in a radically shrinking political space, at the national as well as European level. The 
Greek presidency is being called upon to coordinate a presidential agenda without being 
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substantially involved in its drafting. It will therefore simply mediate between European 
institutions regarding policies. 
2. The domestic and European context of the Greek presidency  
The European and Greek domestic context is, for various reasons, unstable and fragile. Growing 
euroscepticism is easily justified as stemming from the effects of the crisis, and naively linked 
to a very specific anti-European populism, instead of the failure on the part of governing elites 
to tackle the crisis and mitigate its impact.
1
 The debate about how to restore popular legitimacy 
to the EU, so that governance can take place under parliamentary scrutiny, is quite superficial. 
Political choices are extremely constrained by the hegemonic economic perception that social 
policy is not an integral part of the European model, leaving little room for manoeuvre. Issues 
of growth and jobs are structurally integrated into the economic governance agenda, based 
mainly on a regulative system for competition and with a strong disciplinary focus.
2
  
Greece faces enormous challenges. Economic and social restructuring is being imposed on 
Greek society; the most vulnerable on the European periphery. The state must meet its debt 
obligations within a European environment where at best a slow and fragile recovery lies ahead 
for the eurozone.
3
 The domestic political situation is also quite worrying. The recent persecution 
of members of the far-right Golden Dawn party following the murder of Paul Fyssas, a 34 year 
old anti-fascist and hip-hop artist (‘Killah P’) do not resolve the systemic penetration of Nazi 
practices in Greek politics and society.
4
 The consecutive double murder of two members of the 
Nazi party is proof of the growing trivialisation of political extremism. Such political extremism 
leads to societies becoming more conservative overall.
5
 In fact, at national level there is no 
expectation that the presidency will play a significant role. Greeks have always thought that the 
country holding the rotating presidency has a higher profile and has the opportunity to prove 
that it is an honest and reliable partner, thus enhancing its positive image. This time is different, 
however. The spiral of negative economic downturn induced by the continuous pressure for 
further cuts leaves no space for political initiatives at European level. In addition, most Greeks 
consider the EU as being responsible for the austerity measures imposed since the beginning of 
the crisis.
6
 Currently, Greek society is focused on endless arm-wrestling between the coalition 
government and the Troika of lenders (European Commission, European Central Bank and 
International Monetary Fund) rather than the Greek presidency and its (un)expected 
contribution to the European project.  
The penetration of populist ideas into the political mindset influences both ends of the political 
spectrum. This phenomenon is directly related to the difficulty of the coalition government in 
dealing with its debtors and complying with its tough MoU commitments.
7
 The Greek 
                                                     
1
 F. Chatzistavrou, “Le néonazisme grec, une affaire européenne”, Le Monde, 30 May 2013. 
2
 R. Thillaye, “Coordination in place of integration? Economic governance in a non-federal EU”, 
Working Paper No. 32, Policy Network, July 2013, p. 6. 
3
 European Commission, Directorate-General for Economic and Financial Affairs, European Economic 
Forecast, autumn 2013, European Economy, 7/2013, p. 22. 
4
 The head of the Socialist Group in the European Parliament, Hannes Swoboda, urged the Greek 
government and the parliament to include in their actions the possible prohibition of the Golden Dawn, 
denouncing the murder of Paul Fyssas as an incident  “shocking and unacceptable” in all respects in a 
country of the European Union, which caused resentment in Greek government circles. 
5
 F. Chatzistavrou, “Le néonazisme grec, une affaire européenne”, 30 May 2013, idem. 
6
 R. Wilke et al., “The New sick man in Europe”, Pew Research Center, 13 May 2013, Chapter 2 
Economic crisis now an EU crisis, pp. 23-28. 
7
 During several weeks of tough negotiations in November and December 2013, the Greek government 
was faced with the determined attitude of Troika to strictly pursue reforms in order to disburse the 1 
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government justifies its crucial but not properly prepared decisions to fulfil commitments made 
under MoU by the urgency of the situation. The trend of diffuse but palpable populism allows 
the temporal, partial and nebulous definition of positions and orientations of the main political 
parties. The next regional and municipal elections will be held in May 2014, coinciding with the 
European elections. The likelihood that fresh parliamentary elections could also take place at 
the same time further undermines the already fragile political stability of the country.  
In this highly polarised political context, the Troika does not appear to be satisfied with the 
Greek government’s capacity to properly conduct structural reforms and accelerate the 
privatisation programme. This diffuse discontent has been expressed in a certain way through 
the request of two German MPs
8
 of the CDU and FDP, who stress that Greece should resign 
from the 2014 presidency on the grounds that the rotating presidency will cost Greece about 
€100 million. Analysts predict that Greece will need further assistance, although less than the 
previous bailout of €240 billion.9 In that respect, crucial issues concerning the restructuring of 
Greece’s debt and smoothing conditionalities in the event of a new (third) rescue programme of 
economic adjustment seem to be extremely difficult to negotiate. In order for the country to 
achieve debt relief on the part of creditors, the EU and the IMF will have to agree on how to fill 
the financial gaps in the Greek programme. At the end of February 2014, the European 
Statistical Office (Eurostat) will release the official statistics on the 2013 budget and a marginal 
primary surplus.
10
 In the meantime, Germany is excluding any discussion about the haircut of 
some official debt obligations and postpones potential negotiations about the reduction of 
interest rates on aid loans and/or the substantial extension of the period of their repayment
11
 
until after the EP elections, thereby eliminating any chance for Greece to open this discussion 
and outline possible trade-offs during the presidency tenure.  
3. A presidency lacking political will and institutional capacity  
Greek government officials described the economic priorities of the Greek presidency as an 
attempt for a “new narrative which will be practical, specific and progressive”12 demonstrating 
                                                                                                                                                           
billion euro tranche (reform of the state defence firm EAS, liberalisation of mortgage claims etc.). The 
Troika exerts pressure for further fiscal measures in 2014, amounting to 2 billion euros. 
8
 In September 2013, Klaus-Peter Willsch from the Christian Democratic Party stated in the newspaper 
Bild that “Greece should ask the European Commission to postpone the Council Presidency, otherwise it 
will (need) to have more aid package on that score”, while his colleague Frank Schäffler from the Liberal 
Party stressed that “Greece should voluntarily resign from the presidency”. 
9
 D. Papadimitriou (Levy Economics Institute of Bard College), “Greece needs a 21st Century Marshall 
Plan”, Ekathimerini.com, 12 August 2013. 
10
 The Greek budget forecasts a primary budget surplus of €812 million until October 2013 and €2.8 
billion in 2014. The country's debt is expected to fall from 175.5% of GDP in 2013 to174.5% in 2014, 
and unemployment is expected to fall from 27.2% in 2013 to 27.1% in 2014.  
These figures are not unanimously accepted. The OECD projections confirm the improvement of the 
financial situation of the Greek government. If one believes the latest economic forecast in November 
2013, the deficit would be reduced to 2.4% in 2013 and 2.2% in 2014. The OECD confirms that Greece 
hits a primary surplus in 2013 and 2014, which is expected to nearly stabilise the debt burden in GDP in 
2014. According to the OECD, the public debt ratio increased from 176.6% at the end of 2013 to 181.3% 
at the end of 2014, showing a quasi-stabilisation compared to the increase of 20 points in 2013.  
See Eurostat press release euro-indicators 152/2013, 21 October 2013; OECD Economic outlook 
November 2013; Eurostat, Reporting of government deficit and debt levels, Greece, 9 October 2013. 
11
 Another possibility would be to alleviate official debt burdens through some retroactive transfer to the 
ESM.  
12
 Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Venizelos’ speech to the Parliamentary Standing 
Committee on Defence and Foreign Affairs, 31 July 2013. 
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to European citizens that the EU has the tools to bring the crisis under control and to ensure the 
sustainability of the European model. The official discourse of the Greek government refers to 
the necessity of promoting the “European political South”,13 including France, of course. 
Indeed, the country could seriously contribute to the re-politicisation of the debate in Europe, 
thus regaining its status among EU countries. 
But Greece has suffered long-standing governance problems that have worsened dramatically in 
recent years. The domestic economic situation pushed the country into a trap of continuous 
negotiation and renegotiation of close technical-economic conditions for adjustment. Beyond 
strictly formal discourse and official responsibilities assigned to the Greek presidency, state 
structures lack strong political will and the institutional and technical capacity to instigate 
changes in European political culture in order to recalibrate EU’s approach to the euro crisis.  
Greece, with more than €300 billion worth of debt, has a budget of no more than €50 million, 
while the cost of past rotating presidencies – the Irish and Cypriot for example – ranged 
between €60 and €80 million.14 Greek Deputy Foreign Minister Dimitris Kourkoulas 
characterised the presidency as “uncluttered, functional, and decent”.15 Greece bears the cost of 
hosting about 14 top-level meetings (Councils of Ministers, College of Commissioners, 
Conference of Presidents and Speakers of the European Parliament etc.) and a total of 
approximately 130-150 meetings of senior government officials and experts of the EU 
institutions. These meetings take place in the Zappeion exhibition Hall in Athens with the 
informal meetings of Foreign Affairs Ministers (Gymnich) scheduled to be held around Athens, 
at another venue. Draconian security restrictions are imposed, especially for the meetings of EU 
finance ministers. Around 14,500 visitors are expected in Greece.
16
 .   
Greece spends less and employs no more than 150 employees, unlike other recent presidencies 
that employed up to 250 people.
17
 The Office of the Greek Presidency
18
 employs a total of 27 
people to meet the needs of the presidency concerning the planning, coordination and promotion 
of all activities at national and European level during its tenure. Deputy Foreign Minister and 
Secretary General for European Affairs have responsibility for the Office of the Greek 
Presidency, which is directly subordinate to the Minister of Foreign Affairs.
19
 Eighteen staff 
secondments or transfers from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, other ministries and public 
service bodies took place on an individual basis and upon the recommendation of the Head of 
the Office of the Greek Presidency. Furthermore, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs launched over 
nine urgent recruitments through, in principle, a formal selection procedure conducted by the 
Supreme Council of Personnel Selection (ASEP).
20
 In previous Greek presidencies, there was a 
                                                     
13
 Venizelos’ speech, 31 July 2013, idem. 
14
 Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Venizelos’ speech on the occasion of the presentation of 
the logo of the Hellenic Presidency of the Council of the European Union Monday, 25 November 2013. 
15
 Briefing by the Deputy Foreign Minister D. Kourkoulas on the priorities of the Greek Presidency to a 
delegation from the European Parliament’s Women’s Rights and Gender Equality Committee (FEMM) 
and a delegation from the European Parliament’s Employment and Social Affairs Committee (EMPL), 29 
October 2013. 
16
 Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Venizelos’ speech, 25 November 2013, idem. 
17
 Cyprus employed 260 people in 2012 and Poland 300 people in 2011. See Venizelos’ speech, 25 
November 2013, idem. 
18
 Law 4148/2013 FEK (Official Journal of the Greek Government) A99/26.04.2013. Establishment of the 
Greek Presidency Office and other provisions. The Office was founded in April 2013 and will cease to 
exist at the end of July 2014. 
19
 Law 4148/2013 FEK (Official Journal of the Greek Government) A99/26.04.2013, Establishment of the 
Greek Presidency Office and other provisions, Art. 1§1. 
20
 Call for expressions of interest for fixed-term contract staff to meet the needs of the Greek Presidency, 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 330/AΣ 46814, 2 October 2013. Calls for expressions of interest for unpaid 
THE 2014 GREEK PRESIDENCY OF THE EU COUNCIL | 5 
 
selection procedure based on ministries’ propositions to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. This 
time it is unclear whether a proper screening of candidates took place during selection 
procedures.  
During autumn 2013, some training for support staff (presidents of the eight sectoral Councils, 
ministry officials, and political staff) took place with the involvement of the General Secretariat 
of the Council, Greek academics and the National School of Public Administration.   
The Greek government also established an inter-ministerial committee to provide assistance. 
The committee is composed of the Minister of Foreign Affairs and the competent Ministers, 
depending on the thematic meetings. Moreover, a contact person has been designated in each 
Ministry in order to slightly decentralise the Greek presidency’s operations. In the same way, 




Nevertheless, these efforts remain controversial. In fact, the inherent institutional weakness of 
the Greek presidency results from the lack of a ‘clear institutional centre’ for planning and 
management. The Minister of Foreign Affairs Evangelos Venizelos assumes additional 
responsibilities in his role as Vice-President of the Greek government. Consequently, Deputy 
Foreign Minister Dimitris Kourkoulas has a much heavier burden than expected.
22
 The 
Secretary General for European affairs, while he has very limited formal powers, is currently 
serving in the Ministry of National Defence.  
In addition, it seems that there was a ‘diplomatic deficit’ at the head of the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs, which has not properly and promptly assured the smooth functioning of the Greek 
presidency. The Head of the Office of the Greek Presidency, Ambassador Dimitris 
Paraskevopoulos appointed by the Minister of Foreign Affairs, was replaced by Ambassador 
Aristides Androulakis in autumn 2013. Then, in December 2013, he was once again replaced by 
Ambassador Dimitris Karamitsos-Tziras, Deputy Permanent Representative of Greece to the 
United Nations from 2009 to 2013. Apparently, diplomats do not share a positive perception of 
the rotating presidency; finding it much too ‘bureaucratic’. They are not willing to move from 
the outside in. This has resulted in involving mostly senior diplomats in the framework of the 
presidency who do not have a good working knowledge of the Lisbon Treaty (their experience 
does not go beyond the Nice Treaty).   
The role of the Permanent Representation (PR) of Greece in the EU has therefore proved to be 
crucial. The Permanent Representation has been reinforced through staff secondments or the 
extension of the secondment period for some civil servants. But these secondments from all 
ministerial departments took place without always using the appropriate selection procedure. 
The question that remains is whether or not the more than 110 additional staff members that the 
Permanent Representation currently employs have the required qualifications and skill sets to 
                                                                                                                                                           
experts to assist with the organisation, delivery of training activities and advisory services to the 
executives ministries as well as for unpaid special experts and scientists that will assist and support the 
thematic scientific departments of the General Secretariat of the Ministry of environment, energy and 
climate change in the field of environment and sustainable development, including the representation of 
the ministry in meetings and working groups abroad, the Council of the European Union, other EU 
bodies, international organisations and other international and European fora, had also been published.  
21
 Law 4148/2013 FEK (Official Journal of the Greek government) A99/26.04.2013, Establishment of the 
Greek Presidency Office and other provisions, Art. 6. 
22
 C. Ashton, the High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, can delegate some of its 
functions and ask, for example, for being represented by the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the country 
holding the rotating EU Presidency in the European Parliament. 
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work in the multicultural and very demanding environment of the European techno-diplomacy.
23
 
This can also explain why the prolongation of stay of the very experienced Head of the PR, 
Ambassador Th. Sotiropoulos, was considered to be an absolute necessity. Greek ambassadors 
and the deputy permanent representative are entitled to conduct negotiations before the Coreper 
meetings and during trilogues with the European Parliament.  
4. Ambitious priorities within a political vacuum  
The Greek government adopted the pre-designed policy-agenda based on the 18-month 
programme of the Trio presidency,
24
 without including any particular item of national interest. 
The legislative work programme of the Commission (1 January 2013 to 30 June 2014) has been 
drawn up by Ireland, Lithuania and Greece in cooperation with the president of the Council of 
Foreign Affairs, the European Commission and the European Council president. The Greek 
government sent senior government officials to Brussels to discuss possible organisational 
matters of the presidency with officials of the Council. Furthermore, joint coordination meetings 
between Greek MPs and members of the EP took place.
25
 Greece will complete the trio of 
presidencies characterised by weak collegiality. Athens ‘inherited’ the majority of subjects by 
just undertaking piecemeal action and not really investing in the agenda.
26
 
The Greek presidency promotes emergency legislation corresponding to a period of just three 
months instead of six, because the beginning of April 2014 marks the countdown for the EP 
elections. E. Venizelos, the Greek Minister of Foreign Affairs, often underlined that there is just 
enough time for Greece to promote concrete actions through a comprehensive programme of 
legislative and other activities that are already underway, thus finalising the most important 
priorities. However, the post-Lisbon institutional framework has given the EP greater legislative 
powers; limiting the chair’s role to that of mediator between the Council and the European 
Council.  
The formal agenda was uploaded onto the website of the Greek Ministry of Foreign affairs at 
the end of September and is available on the official website of the presidency 
(http://www.gr2014.eu/). While it would be expected that the Greek government submits its 
detailed proposals related to the legislative programme, actually it was the Commission that 
took over all the planning of the agenda. Moreover, given the limited period of the legislative 
action and the necessary progress that has to be made, the Commission decided to sort 185 files 
by the end of 2013,
27
 while putting forward legislative proposals, especially concerning the 
single market and enlargement.  
                                                     
23
 F. Chatzistavrou, “Des diplomates comme les autres? Les représentants permanents auprès de l’UE”, in 
Didier Georgakakis (ed.), Eurocratie. Les professionnels de l’Europe, Economica, 2012. pp. 97-101. 
English edition: “The Permanent Representatives to the EU: Going Native in the European Field?”, in 
Didier Georgakakis and Jay Rowell (eds), The Field of Eurocracy: Mapping EU Actors and 
Professionals, Palgrave Macmillan, 2013. 
24
 Note of the Trio Presidency, 18 month programme of the Council (1 January 2013 - 30 June 2014), 
17426/12, Council of the EU, 7 December 2012. 
25
 Conference of Speakers of the European Parliament at the Hellenic Parliament, press release, 26 
November 2013. 
26
 F. Chatzistavrou, “Les Etats de l’Union européenne, moteurs d’une forme de gouvernance inédite: le 
Trio de Présidences”, Revue du marché commun et de l’union européenne, No. 568, May 2013, pp. 282-3. 
27
 Briefing by the Deputy Foreign Minister D. Kourkoulas on the priorities of the Greek Presidency in the 
Permanent Representation of Greece, 1 October 2013. 
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While the situation in Greece reaches its lowest point
28
 the country is called upon to stick to an 
agenda that is even more divorced from domestic political reality. The presidency’s priorities 
are divided into four sections: (a) Growth - Jobs - Cohesion, (b) Further integration of the EU; 
eurozone, (c) Migration - Borders - Mobility and (d) Maritime Policy. This official agenda of 
the Greek presidency is based on the triptych ‘growth and cohesion, EMU and the security of 
Europe’,29 and includes the following items: 
4.1 The institutional strengthening of EMU and the eurozone on the 
basis of the principle of institutional parity of member states  
Greece faces the most intrusive economic and budgetary surveillance of any eurozone state, but 
supports the EU's long-standing objective of strengthening the EMU governance framework. In 
cooperation with the European Council and the Parliament, it is pursuing some of the goals 
agreed upon in the trio programme with its immediate predecessors, namely Ireland and 
Lithuania. The real challenge here is to accommodate the concerns of the still vulnerable 
members of the Union, as well as the interests of the wealthiest countries, about the best way 
forward.   
This priority ranking on the agenda entails the effective implementation of the new mechanisms 
of economic governance of the Union with an emphasis on the supervision of banking and 
financial services. Tangible progress is to be made towards agreement on the Commission’s 
latest proposal on the Single Resolution Mechanism (SRM), the Deposit Guarantee Scheme 
Directive and the Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive. In that respect, Greece counted on 
the Lithuanian presidency to reach the final agreement on the general approach on the banking 
union, and more specifically on the regulation on the single resolution mechanism (SRM) 
adopted by the Council of the EU and the European Council,
30
 before the relevant discussions 
with the European Parliament in order to reach an overall agreement on the SRM during the 
Greek presidency. Greece also intends to implement the ‘two pack’ mechanism. At the same 
time, another objective is to promote, as a matter of urgency, given the short legislative period 
until the elections for the European Parliament – issues concerning tax fraud and tax evasion as 
well as the Financial Transaction Tax. Although Athens promised to make progress on the issue 
of banking union, like most countries that undertake the EU presidency, it sees itself as an 
‘honest broker’ rather than as the entity that will manage a final agreement.31 
                                                     
28
 In Greece, after six years of deepening recession, real GDP has shrunk by more than one-quarter since 
2007, with total unemployment reaching as much as 61.5% for the country’s youth (the highest rates in 
Europe in June 2013). 
29
 The Greek presidency’s agenda includes other issues, such as the issue of security and liability for 
nuclear accidents. The objective is to draft a new directive promoting nuclear safety, which takes into 
account new scientific data derived from the experience of Fukushima.  
Furthermore, Greece seems willing to make more effort to deepen and expand economic and trade 
cooperation with China through further dialogue and negotiations. Greek high-level officials affirmed 
their commitment to support the Middle East peace process through the active involvement of the US and 
the Quartet by offering guarantees for its sustainability.  
NATO Secretary General A. Rasmussen stressed the role to be played by the Greek presidency in the 
development of European defence capabilities. The Council of defence ministers in December 2013 
examined the possibilities of better coordination and cooperation between NATO and the European 
Union.  
30
 Conclusions of the European Council in 19-20 December 2013 EUCO 217/13, p. 16, point 29. See also 
S. Piedrafita and V. Renman, “Exceeding expectations, Lithuania moves the Trio presidency forward”, 
CEPS Commentary, 22 January 2014, pp. 1-2. 
31
 Briefing by the Deputy Foreign Minister D. Kourkoulas, 1 October 2013, idem. 
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4.2 The completion of the internal market, the promotion of growth and 
tackling unemployment 
Economic growth is a matter of paramount importance in official EU discourse. Having 
experienced a breakdown in economic and social cohesion, Greece aims to spark pro-growth 
conversations and promote initiatives in the name of growth during its presidency tenure. In line 
with the Europe 2020 strategy, the ‘balance’ between political stability and financial 
development policies is the touchstone of the EU’s commitment towards more coherence 
between the Union economies. Particular emphasis is placed on the social dimension of the 
eurozone as one of the building blocks for deeper integration in response to the demographic 
and fiscal crisis of the European welfare state, but without seeking to create new funds in 
Brussels. Instead, the Greek Presidency seeks to accelerate disbursement of already existing 
funds for tackling youth unemployment.  
One of the objectives of the official agenda is to rebalance the necessary fiscal consolidation by 
further implementing an enhanced and realistic “Compact for Growth and Jobs” – agreed by the 
European Council in June 2012 – through the acceleration of major infrastructure projects. This 
Compact can be transformed into a diverse European investment programme, and a new 
European model of cohesion policy with a focus on employment. In this framework, Greece 
intends to implement the mechanism for providing credit facilities to SMEs.  
The idea is to start a debate on the subject areas that offer high growth potential (e.g. projects 
for SMEs, basic infrastructure, energy and climate) and at the same time define the role of the 
European Investment Bank and of the European Central Bank in relation to these labour-
intensive projects.  
The presidency is also going to promote issues relating to employment policies, health and 
safety at work, competitiveness, research and innovation energy. In particular, the Greek 
presidency intends to develop initiatives towards ensuring the supply of gas to the EU and 
finalisation of projects to be funded under the new financial framework for 2014-2020, as well 
as to promote youth entrepreneurship by adopting the conclusions of the Council of Ministers 
scheduled to take place by the end of May 2014, and the second programme for sports covering 
the period 2014-17. A first step in this direction was taken in June 2013 when the European 
Council decided to strengthen efforts to combat youth unemployment and to adopt the joint 
EIB-Commission “Investment action plan to finance for SMEs as key employers in the 
European economy”. The forthcoming launch by the European Commission of a White Paper 
covering the subject areas that offer high growth potential could be a springboard for future 
action. The interim evaluation of the “Europe 2020 Strategy” at the spring 2014 European 
Council will lend context and offers the opportunity for concrete initiatives.
32
 
In fact, progress towards greater social cohesion within and between member states depends 
critically on the support of the major member states, especially Germany. The grand coalition 
between CDU/CSU and SPD shares the views of A. Merkel and W. Schaüble on Germany’s 
European policy. 
4.3 A more coherent European migration policy, including the issue of 
human mobility within the EU or from outside the EU 
Greece is receiving large numbers of refugees and immigrants without any specific plan for 
dealing with immigration flows. As part of its role as Chair of the Council, the Greek 
government should tackle a number of issues such as border control, border management, 
strengthening of preventive action to control immigration, agreements with third countries and 
                                                     
32
 Conclusions of the European Council in 27-28 June 2013 EUCO 104/2/13 REV 2, pp. 5-7. See Joint 
Commission-EIB report: “Increasing lending to the economy: implementing the EIB capital increase”.  
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the European asylum system. Immigration and asylum policy has again become particularly 
topical after the events in Lampedusa. It has given the Greek government a chance to take up 
the issue in order to emphasise the necessity of an integrated border management approach. 
Since Frontex is not a panacea to all problems, it would therefore be valuable to discuss the 
eventual revision of the Dublin III regulation (named Dublin IV). Instead, a Declaration on 
Migration in the Mediterranean will be issued.
33
 
One of the key aims of the Greek presidency is to strengthen preventive action in third countries 
of origin and transit of illegal immigration for the benefit of all member states as well as to 
facilitate the issue of visas to third countries. Because of the upcoming expiration of the 
‘Stockholm programme 2010-14’, the Greek presidency contributes to creating new strategic 
objectives and will set the priorities of the EU in the field of Justice and Home Affairs for the 
period 2014-18. Along with the above, the renewal of the “EU Action Plan on tackling 
migration pressure”34 is an opportunity to focus on measures tackling illegal immigration, 
readmission and return, combating human trafficking and enhancing institutional capacity-
building for border management.  
The Greek presidency is concentrating its efforts on ensuring a better implementation of the 
readmission agreements already in force with Turkey and Pakistan. Another priority of the 
presidency is the implementation of the Common European Asylum System, with particular 
emphasis on measures to strengthen solidarity towards those member states facing particular 
migratory flow pressure with respect to their international and European obligations, and in 
cooperation with international organisations (e.g., UNHCR, IOM) and NGOs. Finally, Greece 
needs to address the thorny question of Bulgaria’s and Romania’s accession to the Schengen 
area as of 1 January 2014 since some member states, especially France and the Netherlands, are 
opposing their inclusion in this area of open borders.  
4.4 The promotion of an integrated maritime policy  
On the basis of the Declaration of Limassol on the Integrated Maritime Policy adopted during 
the Cyprus
35
 presidency, the Greek presidency is expected to work closely with the next Italian 
presidency towards a common policy agenda for 2014 called the ‘Mediterranean year’.36 The 
aim is to include the Integrated Maritime Policy in the European agenda for creating growth and 
jobs in the marine and maritime sectors, which includes several policies such as ocean policy,
37
 
water policy, the blue growth strategy, maritime spatial planning, the Adriatic-Ionian 
                                                     
33
 Interview with P. Koutsoumpelis, President of the Hellenic Centre for European Studies (EKEM), 4 
November 2013. 
34
 Initially, EU Ministers of Justice and Home Affairs (JHA) adopted in April 2012 an action paper 
entitled, “EU Action on migratory pressures”. This action paper became a ‘living document’ that is 
updated on a regular basis by rotating presidencies on a biannual basis, taking into account developments 
in relation to migratory pressures, the progress achieved in the implementation of the actions and any 
relevant recommendations in the annual report of the Commission on asylum and immigration. See 
presidency note “EU Action on migratory pressures - A Strategic response”, Council of the EU, 8714/1/12 
REV 1, 23 April 2012. 
35
 On 7 October 2012, EU ministers responsible for maritime affairs adopted the Limassol Declaration 
that aims at re-energising the EU’s Integrated Maritime Policy (IMP), five years after its initial launch in 
Lisbon. This political declaration was expected to mark a milestone for the future implementation and 
development of the EU’s IMP by providing guidelines for a coherent approach to the sustainable 
exploitation of the EU’s seas and oceans for achieving economic growth.   
36
 Joint statements of E. Venizelos, Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister and E. Bonino, Italian 
Foreign Minister, following their meeting in Rome, 17 September 2013. 
37
 Since its creation in 2007, the Integrated Maritime Policy (IMP) seeks to enhance the coherence and 
coordination of maritime policies across sectors. 




 the maritime security strategy, marine and coastal sustainable tourism, and issues of 
migration by sea. The emphasis is on the management of maritime borders of the Union and the 
safety benefits of establishing maritime zones. This issue horizontally permeates the whole 
subject of priorities. The presidency also focuses on the initiative of the European Commission 
establishing a strategy on “Challenges and Opportunities for Marine and Coastal Tourism in the 
EU”39 to enhance the sustainable economic development of these special forms of tourism and 
to strengthen the competitiveness of  European industry. 
Nevertheless, with the thorny question of how to delineate and ensure full recognition of its 
exclusive economic zone (EEZ, or AOZ in Greek), Greece is inclined to adopt a national 
approach rather than a comprehensive European strategy on maritime issues. 
4.5 Enlargement is not the Greek presidency’s priority 
Despite previous commitments, Athens dropped the enlargement issue from its priorities.
40
 
Greece previously promoted the idea of being a leading actor in the European integration of 
Western Balkans.
41
 The preliminary agenda for Greece’s presidency dated 14 February 2011 
was based on the joint programme of the Trio presidency. This preliminary agenda included 
Athens’ proposal to convene an EU-Western Balkans Summit (the ‘Agenda 2014’, otherwise 
called ‘Thessaloniki II’) aimed at adopting a political declaration that would set a specific, 




Instead of getting on with thorny issues, Greece chose not to take any risks and made a rational 
and tactical choice by pulling enlargement out of its priority list. This doesn’t mean that the 
enlargement issue is completely off the agenda. Deputy Foreign Minister D. Kourkoulas 
                                                     
38
 The Adriatic-Ionian Initiative (AII) was formally established as a political initiative at a conference 
held in Ancona, Italy in May 2000. This initiative brings together eight member countries: Albania, 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Greece, Italy, Montenegro, Slovenia and Serbia. The aim of the AII is 
to link the coastal countries of the two seas for the purpose of cooperating in the development and safety 
of the whole area. 
39
 In the period of 14.05.2012 to 06.08.2012, the European Commission launched a public consultation to 
gather views and additional information on the multiple challenges for coastal and maritime tourism. 
Then, the European Commission presented a communication on the “Challenges and Opportunities for 




 Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Venizelos’ speech, 25 November 2013, idem. 
41
 Greece is among the most ardent supporters of the European integration of the Western Balkans. The 
Stabilisation and Association Process (SAP) is the framework regulating the EU’s relations with the 
countries of the Western Balkans. The Thessaloniki Agenda, adopted during Greece’s 2003 EU 
Presidency, was a landmark in this process. 
42
 The ‘Agenda 2014’ (‘Thessaloniki II’) was included for months in the programme of the Greek 
presidency and was one of its priorities to accelerate the process of enlargement and increase 
competitiveness in the region. According to a non paper issued by the Greek Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 
the ‘Agenda 2014’ should set three main goals, i.e. i) creation of a ‘Group 2014’, which will consist of 
member states that will form ‘preparation coalitions’ with candidate countries, ii) enhancement of close 
cooperation ties among candidates on a regional level through further development of existing 
cooperation platforms and interaction between those platforms, and iii) conclusion of an agreement giving 
a specific date for the full accession of Western Balkans countries that are ready to join the EU.  
The aim of the Agenda 2014 should be to celebrate the symbolic integration of the Balkans and to 
commemorate 100 years since World War I, as well as to avoid creating a ‘black hole’ in the region 
through the implementation of the principles of good neighbourliness, regional cooperation, 
reconciliation and democratic consolidation.  
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underlined that enlargement has been and will continue to be a priority for the country, but 
pointed out that Greece will deal with the case of each individual country during the presidency 
according to their performance rather than to organise relevant long discussions and events.
43
 
The Greek government seeks to restore some of the reputation gained by the Thessaloniki 
Summit in 2003 through its organisation of the first Serbian conference on 21 January 2014 – 
launching the opening of accessions negotiations between the EU and Serbia.
44
 The EU-Turkey 
Association Council is also going to take place during the Greek presidency.
45
 Despite the good 
relations and cooperation between the two countries, Greece taking over the EU’s rotating 
presidency will not help Turkey to make progress in its bid to join the European Union, as 
bilateral disputes between the two countries remain unresolved. 
5. The approach of a weak Greek presidency 
From an institutional point of view, the rotating presidency has lost much of its strength since 
the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, since it does not preside over meetings of the Foreign 
Affairs Council, the European Council and the Eurogroup. The presidency’s agenda largely 
depends on Commission initiative. For this reason the European Commission is concerned to 
prevent any agenda failure that could undermine the legislative work programme. Certainly, the 
lack of political leadership in Greece reinforces the already weak institutional position of the 
rotating presidency. The Greek government would like to promote the idea that the achievement 
of a primary surplus makes Greece an equal partner in the EU system of governance by 
restoring its lost sovereignty and endowing this presidency with a real European mission. After 
six years of recession, the current official scenario for Greece is one of emergence from 
recession; enabling the country to return to growth in 2014 and allowing the Greek government 
to soften austerity measures. 
It is extremely difficult for Greece to maintain the image of a stable country, however. The 
structural surplus is the result of austerity measures, which is not an economically and socially 
viable solution. The country has no growth prospects that would allow it to combat rising 
unemployment. The cycle of domestic uncertainty and growing social and wealth inequality is 
the worst ‘multiplier’ in the Greek crisis. In this context, Greece presiding over the Council of 
the EU cannot be the standard-bearer for a pro-European message. This trend has a very 
negative impact on the behaviour and confidence of public administrators, whose personal 
investment is vital for the smooth functioning of the presidency. 
The Greek government is insistent that even though the country finds itself in straitened social 
and economic circumstances, this does not affect the exercise of the rotating Council 
presidency. It is taking on the role of honest broker and putting aside its national interests for six 
months. Greece could restore a sense of mission to its presidency by contributing substantially 
to the political debate in Europe. The best way to do that is to address the need to restore public 
confidence in the European economy, and to deal with the unbalanced and opaque decision-
making that plagues the eurozone.  
                                                     
43
 See “Greece drops enlargement from its EU presidency priorities”, Euractiv, 23 August 2013. 
44
 EU foreign ministers have agreed to start membership talks with Serbia in January 2014. See Council 
conclusions on the enlargement and stabilisation and association process, General Affairs Council 
meeting, 17 December 2013, Brussels, p. 7, points 28 and 29. 
45
 Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Venizelos’ speech to the Parliamentary Standing 
Committee on Defence and Foreign Affairs, 31 July 2013.    
The Association Council meeting provides a timely opportunity to review EU-Turkey relations. The EU 
notes progress made by Turkey in its preparations in the framework of the negotiating process. While the 
very important Chapter 22 on regional policy remains blocked, there are other important chapters, such as 
Chapters 23 and 24, which could be opened. 
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